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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j)
(1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court properly convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for

judgment on the pleadings and apply the proper standard?
2.

Did the defendants have a duty to conduct a groundwater survey and create

a groundwater plan in the Pahvant Valley in 1992 to 1996 or did they exceed their
authority?
3.

Having determined to conduct a groundwater survey in the Pahvant Valley,

did the defendants have an obligation to the Tuttles to conduct the survey in a nonnegligent manner?
4.

Were the defendants estopped from contradicting the 1996 groundwater

survey?
5.

Was the Tuttles' notice of claim timely?

6.

Did the trial court err in dismissing the Tuttles5 takings and estoppel claims?

All of these issues were decided by the trial court on a motion to dismiss, which the
trial court treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The standard of review for
both issues is correctness. See Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co.. 910 P.2d 1218,
1220 (Utah 1996) (standard of review for motion to dismiss is correctness); Miller v.

1

Gastronomy, Inc., 2005 U T App. 80, ^[6, 110 P.3d 144 (standard of review for motion for
judgment on the pleadings is correctness).
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAWS
1.

2.

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
a.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6);

b.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).

Groundwater Survey and Groundwater Plan.
a.

The Tuttles have been unable to locate any determinative law on this

issue, which appears to be a matter of first impression.
3.

Negligent Survey.
a.

Nelson ex rel. Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah

b.

Brinkerhoff v. Salt Lake City. 13 Utah 2d 214, 371 P.2d211 (Utah

1996);

1962).
4.

Estoppel.
a.

Mendez v. Department of Social Services. 813 P.2d 1234, 1236

(Utah App. 1991).
5.

Notice of Claim.
a.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-121;

!

The Legislature repealed the Utah Governmental Immunity Act during its 2004
general session and replaced it with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. See Laws
2

b.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11(1);

c.

Bank One Utah v. West Jordan City. 2002 U T App. 271, ^8, 54

P.3d 135.
6.

Estoppel and Takings Claims.
a.

Bowles v. State ex. rel. Dept. of Transportation, 652 P.2d 1345, 1346

(Utah 1982);
b.

El Rancho Enters.. Inc.. v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 779

(Utah 1977);
c.

Colman v. State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622, 634 (Utah 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises out of water rights in the Pahvant Valley in Millard County, Utah.
Appellants William J. Tuttle, Charlene W. Tuttle, Kenton Tuttle and Lori M. Tuttle
(collectively "the Tuttles") owned a number of tracts of land in the valley. The parcels
came to approximately 1,700 acres, which the Tuttles farmed. Since the time that the
Tuttles purchased these parcels, they used various water rights to irrigate the majority of
the property.

2004, ch 267. The Legislature provided, however, that "1) injuries alleged to be caused
by a governmental entity that occurred before July 1, 2004, be governed by the provisions
of Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act; and (2) injuries alleged to be
caused by a governmental entity that occurred on or after July 1, 2004, be governed by
the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 30d, Governmental Immunity Act of Utah." Thus,
this claim is governed by the former Act.
3

In 1992, the State Engineer announced that he was going to perform a
groundwater survey of the Pahvant Valley and create a groundwater plan. A few years
later, the State Engineer stated that the creation of the groundwater plan would proceed
in three phases. In the first phase, the State Engineer would conduct a survey of the
irrigated acreage and the water rights in the area to m a k e sure that the areas which were
being irrigated h a d sufficient water rights. If the State Engineer determined that a person
was irrigating property without sufficient water rights, that person would receive a letter.
If the person continued to irrigate without sufficient water rights, the State Engineer
would take legal action.
Because the Tuttles wanted to be sure that their water rights were sufficient, they
went to the State Engineer's regional office in Richfield. T h e employees there told them
that if they h a d not received a letter, they were entitled to continue irrigating their
property.
In M a r c h of 1996, the State Engineer sent a letter to property owners in the
Pahvant Valley stating that the first phase of the survey h a d been completed. T h o s e
persons that the State Engineer had determined were irrigating illegally h a d received a
letter and all of the irrigated property in the valley was now covered by valid water rights.
T h e Tuttles h a d never received a letter, although they knew people w h o h a d received
letters. T h e State Engineer h a d forced these people to stop irrigating.
In 1998, the Tuttles decided to sell their properly. Based on the events of 1992 to
1996, they advertised the land as having sufficient water rights to irrigate the property as
4

the Tuttles had historically irrigated it. They were contacted by Grant and Fern
Ellsworth, who were California residents. The Tuttles eventually sold the property to the
Ellsworths.
After the Tuttles sold the property to the Ellsworths, Terry Monroe ("Monroe"), an
employee of the State Engineer's office contacted the Ellsworths and stated that he had
concerns about the water rights. Although Monroe stated he would work with the
Ellsworths to address his concerns, the Ellsworths did not work with Monroe. They
started a legal action against the Tuttles in federal court.
Monroe later performed further analysis of the water rights and claimed that they
were sufficient to irrigate only about 953 acres. Monroe testified to this effect at the trial
between the Ellsworths and the Tuttles in federal court. The jury in the federal court
returned a verdict for the Ellsworths on April 30, 2003 in the amount of $1,113,840. This
was later supplemented by $260,184.83 in attorney's fees and costs. Although the Tuttles
appealed this verdict, it was upheld by the Federal Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Prior to 1998, the Tuttles were the owners of two farms in the Pahvant Valley in
Millard County, Utah. Plaintiff William Tuttle owned approximately 1,100 acres
("William's Farm"). Plaintiff Kenton Tuttle owned approximately 640 acres ("Kenton's
Farm"). R. at 2 - 8. During the time that the Tuttles owned the farms, they used various
water rights to irrigate their farms. William's Farm was irrigated using water rights 67119, 67-137, 67-160, 67-286, 67-287, and 67-304. Kenton's Farm was irrigated using
5

water rights 67-692, 67-694, 67-708, and 67-867. R. at 2 -8. The Tuttles believed that
they had sufficient water rights to irrigate their entire farms and did irrigate the farms for
the entire time they owned the farms without complaint or incident. R. at 2 - 8.
In 1992, the State Engineer announced that he intended to create a new water
management plan for the Pahvant Valley. R. at 8. A few years later, the State Engineer
announced that the creation of the new groundwater management plan for the Pahvant
Valley would proceed in three phases. R. at 8. In the first phase, the State Engineer
would conduct a survey of the irrigated acreage in the valley to determine whether the
property was being irrigated with proper and sufficient water rights. R. at 8. If it was
determined that property was being irrigated without a valid or sufficient water rights, the
owner would receive a letter. If the owner continued to irrigate the property without valid
water rights or with insufficient water rights, the State Engineer would commence legal
action to stop the illegal irrigation. R. at 8.
In an effort to verify the validity and sufficiency of their water rights to irrigate their
entire farms, the Tuttles went into the State Engineer's regional office in Richfield to
confirm that their irrigation was under valid and sufficient water rights. R. at 9 - 10. The
Tuttles were told that if they had not received a letter, their water rights were valid and
sufficient, and they were entitled to continue to irrigate the land as they had historically
done. R. at 9 - 10.
In March of 1996, the plaintiff received a letter from the State Engineer's office
indicating that the first phase of the groundwater management plan had been completed
6

and all irrigated land in the Pahvant Valley was now covered by a valid water right. R. at
10. A copy of this letter is included as Exhibit "A" in the Addendum. The Tuttles never
received a letter or any other information from the State Engineer informing them that
they did not have a valid water right sufficient to irrigate William's or Kenton's entire
Farms. R. at 10.
In 1998, the Tuttles decided to sell the farms. R. at 10. Based on the
communications they had received from the State Engineer's office, the Tuttles advertised
the land as having water rights and informed prospective buyers that there were valid and
sufficient water rights to irrigate the entire farms. R. at 10 -11. The Tuttles transferred
the farms to Grant Ellsworth and Fern Ellsworth ("the Ellsworths") in December 1998 via
a §1031 exchange. The full transaction was closed on July 1, 1999. They also transferred
all of the water rights associated with the farms to the Ellsworths. R. at 11.
On or about December 6, 2000, defendant Terry Monroe ("Monroe") sent a letter
to the Ellsworths informing the Ellsworths that Monroe had concerns about the water
rights for the farms. R. at 11. Although Monroe informed the Ellsworths that he was
willing to work with the Ellsworths to review Monroe's concerns, the Ellsworths did not
work with Monroe to address the problems. Instead, the Ellsworths commenced a lawsuit
against the Tuttles in the Federal District Court for the District of Utah ("the Federal
Lawsuit"). R. at 11 - 12. Monroe later performed a further evaluation of the water rights
which the Tuttles had transferred to the Ellsworths and determined that the water rights
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were sufficient to irrigate only 484 acres of William's Farm and 451.2 acres of Kenton's
Farm. R. at 135.
At the trial of the Federal Lawsuit, Monroe testified on behalf of the Ellsworths.
Monroe testified that the water rights were insufficient to irrigate the entire farms the
Tuttles sold to the Ellsworths. R. at 12. Monroe testified that the water rights were
sufficient to irrigate only 935.2 acres of the approximately 1,700 acres the Ellsworths had
purchased from the Tuttles. R. at 134.
The jury in the federal lawsuit found in favor of the Ellsworths. The jury reached
its verdict on April 30, 2003. See Exhibit "A" attached to the Defendants' Memorandum
in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. R. at 134 -35. The Federal District Court
entered judgment against the Tuttles in the amount of $1,113,840 on July 7, 2003. The
original judgment was for fraud, breach of warranty, wrongful conversion, breach of
contract and for punitive damages based on the fraud. R. at 134 -135. The Federal
District Court entered a supplemental judgment against the Tuttles in the amount of
$260,184.83 on October 7, 2003. This judgment was for attorney's fees and costs. See
Exhibit "B" attached to the Defendants5 Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss. R. at 135.
The Tuttles appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court, which upheld the jury's verdict
and affirmed the judgment. R. at 135.
The Tuttles filed their notice of claim on April 29, 2004. R. at 140.

8

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Although the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, the trial court decided to treat
the motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In making its decision, however,
the trial court did not limit itself to the allegations in the pleadings and did not accept the
allegations of the complaint as true. The trial court therefore committed error which
warrants reversal.
The trial court granted the motion on two major bases. First, the trial court ruled
that the State Engineer had no duty to provide an error-free survey of the groundwater
resources in the Pahvant Valley. Instead, the court held that owners of water rights are
presumed to know the amount of water which they own and can only alter water rights
through statutory procedures. This conclusion of the trial court is error because the trial
court failed to acknowledge that the State Engineer had no duty or authority to determine
water rights in the Pahvant Valley on his own initiative. The State Engineer can only
determine water rights through a court action after receiving a petition.
Having decided to determine water rights through the groundwater survey when
he had no duty or authority to do so, the State Engineer had a duty to perform the survey
with reasonable care. The trial court's conclusion that the Tuttles were not entitled to an
error-free determination of the groundwater resources is incorrect. By acting where he
had no duty and outside his scope of authority, the State Engineer assumed a duty to
conduct the survey with reasonable care.

9

Furthermore, having made at least two representations to the Tuttles that their
water rights were sufficient, the State Engineer was estopped from later changing its
position and claiming that the Tuttles (and later the Ellsworths) did not have sufficient
water rights to irrigate the water as they had previously done.
The second basis of the trial court's decision to grant the motion for judgment on
the pleadings was its belief that the Tuttles5 notice of claim was untimely. The trial court
correctly determined that the notice of claim was due within one year of the time that the
claims arose. Although the trial court did not determine when the claims arose, it did
determine that the claims arose before the jury returned its verdict in the federal court
case and the notice of claim was therefore untimely. In fact, the claims against these
defendants arose when the jury in the federal action delivered its verdict on April 30,
2003, and the notice of claim was filed timely on April 29, 2004.
Finally, even if the trial court was correct that the notice of claim was untimely,
that would not affect the Tuttles' estoppel claims or its takings claims. These claims were
not addressed in the court's decision. Because these claims were not addressed, they are
still viable and the court's decision to dismiss the complaint was improper.

10

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVERTING T H E
MOTION TO DISMISS INTO A M O T I O N FOR
J U D G M E N T ON THE PLEADINGS AND D I D N O T APPLY
THE PROPER STANDARD IN DECIDING T H E M O T I O N .

At the hearing on this matter, the trial court announced that, although the
defendants had filed a motion to dismiss, it was granting a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. This was error. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) may be filed
immediately after the complaint is filed in lieu of an answer. See Rule 12(a); Milton I
Shadur, 2 Moore's Federal Practice §12.12 (Matthew Bender 2006) ("Although a
defendant. . . may present every defense in a responsive pleading, Rule 12 permits the
party to raise certain defenses and objections by motion filed before serving the answer").
A motion for judgment on the pleadings, on the other hand, must be filed "After
the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial." Rule 12(c).
In this matter, the pleadings had not been closed-the defendants had not filed an
answer. The only pleading which had been made was the complaint.
The trial court apparently converted the motion to a motion for judgment on the
pleadings in the belief that this would allow it to consider matters outside the pleadings.
This is, however, incorrect. '"The grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is
7reviewed under the same standard as the grant of a motion to dismiss, i.e., we affirm the
grant of such a motion only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the
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facts alleged."' Miller v. Gastronomy. Inc.. 2005 U T App. 80, ^|6, 110 P.3d 144 (quoting
Thimmes v. Utah State Univ.. 2001 U T App 93, ^|4, 22 P.3d 257).
In addition, in a considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court must construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences
in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & light Co.. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); Russell v.
Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995).
At the hearing of this matter, the trial court considered many matters which were
outside the pleadings, particularly the basis for the jury's decision in the federal court
action. The trial court also did not construe the allegations in the light most favorable to
the Tuttles, but relied in large part on the decisions made in the federal courts. This was
error and requires the reversal of the trial court's decision in this matter.
II.

THE STATE ENGINEER HAD N O DUTY OR AUTHORITY
TO C O N D U C T T H E GROUNDWATER SURVEY, IMPOSE
A GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT PLAN OR
DETERMINE WATER RIGHTS IN THE PAHVANT
VALLEY.

In 1992, the State Engineer announced that he intended to conduct a groundwater
survey of the Pahvant Valley. A few years later, the State Engineer announced that the
groundwater survey would proceed in three stages. The first was that the State Engineer
would review the water rights in the valley and determine whether all of the property
which was being irrigated was covered by valid water rights. If the State Engineer
determined that any property was being irrigated without a valid water right, the State
Engineer would first send a notice to the person irrigating the property. If the person
12

continued to irrigate without a valid water right, the State Engineer would commence
legal action to stop the illegal irrigation.
This scheme was illegal for two reasons. First, the State Engineer had no right to
conduct the groundwater survey. Second, the procedure proposed by the State Engineer
allowed him, in effect, to determine water rights outside of a district court action in
violation of Utah law. Thus, the State Engineer exceeded his authority in conducting the
groundwater survey in the Pahvant Valley.
A.

The State Engineer H a d No Authority to Conduct a
Groundwater Survey or I m p o s e a Groundwater
M a n a g e m e n t Plan.

The State Engineer exceeded his authority in creating the groundwater
management plan in the first place. It is axiomatic that the State Engineer only has the
power that is delegated to him in the statute. Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball,
76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116 (1930). The State Engineer's authority and duties are described
in Utah Code Ann. §73-2-1 (2006). In this statute, the State Engineer is given wide
authority to take such actions as: 1) providing administrative supervision of waters and
water rights, 2) making rules to govern water issues, 3) bringing suit to enjoin or prevent
violations of water law, 4) upon request of a irrigation district, survey land proposed for
annexation into the district to determine the amount of water which can be beneficially
used on the land, and 5) establishing water distribution systems and their boundaries.
Nowhere in this statute, however, is the State Engineer authorized or required to
perform a survey of the water rights in a particular area and to impose a groundwater
13

management plan on the area. In this regard, it is important to note that in the 2006
General Session of the Utah Legislature, a bill was proposed which would have
authorized the State Engineer to create groundwater management plans. See draft
legislation, attached as Exhibit "B" in the Addendum. Although this bill was not passed,
the fact that it was considered necessary indicates that the State Engineer was not required
to perform this survey of the Pahvant Valley and had no authority to impose the
groundwater plan in the Pahvant Valley.
B.

T h e State Engineer m u s t D e t e r m i n e Water Rights T h r o u g h
an Adjudication.

Utah Code Ann. §73-4-1 (a) (2006), prescribes the procedure the State Engineer
must follow in determining water rights. That section states:
Upon a verified petition to the state engineer, signed by five or more or a
majority of water users upon any stream or water source, requesting the
investigation of the relative rights of the various claimants to the waters of
such stream or water source, it shall be the duty of the state engineer, if
upon such investigation he finds the facts and conditions are such as to
justify a determination of said rights, to file in the district court an action to
determine the various rights. In any suit involving water rights the court
may order an investigation and survey by the state engineer of all the water
rights on the source or system involved.
The first relevant feature of the system for determining water rights is that the State
Engineer may not commence a determination of water rights himself. He cannot act until
he has received a verified petition signed by five or more water users or a majority of the
water users in an area. In the case of the Pahvant Valley, however, it appears that the

14

State Engineer violated this limitation and commenced the determination of water rights
on his own initiative.2
A second important feature of the procedure for determining water rights is that, if
the State Engineer receives a proper petition, he must commence an action in the district
court to determine the water rights. In this matter, the State Engineer determined the
water rights in the Pahvant Valley without any involvement from the courts.3
Clearly, the State Engineer had no right or authority to conduct the determination
of water rights as he did in the Pahvant Valley.
III.

EVEN IF THE STATE ENGINEER HAD AUTHORITY TO
PERFORM THE GROUNDWATER SURVEY IN THE
PAHVANT VALLEY, HE WAS UNDER N O OBLIGATION
TO D O SO AND HE HAD A DUTY TO PERFORM THE
SURVEY WITH REASONABLE CARE.

Utah courts have consistently found that when a person (including a governmental
agency) undertakes an action which the person has no duty to perform, and another relies
on that action, the person must perform the act with ordinary or reasonable care.
For instance, in Nelson ex. rel. Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah
1996), a mother took her child to a park in Salt Lake City. The park was adjacent to the

2

In fact, it appears that the State Engineer violated this provision twice in this matter.
The first time was in 1992 when the State Engineer decided to commence the initial survey and
groundwater plan. The second time was in 2000 when the State Engineer, through Terry
Monroe, contacted the Ellsworths and told them that they did not have the water claimed.
3

The State Engineer also violated this provision in 2000 when Terry Monroe informed
the Ellsworths that they did not have the water rights which they believed they had received in
the transaction with the Tuttles. The State Engineer made this determination without the
involvement of a court.
15

Jordan River and the child went through a hole in the fence, fell into the river and
suffered permanent injuries. The mother sued and the city defended on the basis that it
was immune. The trial court granted the city's motion for summary judgment and the
mother appealed.
On appeal, the city once again asserted that it was immune. The Utah Supreme
Court disagreed. Although the court did not determine whether the City had a duty to
erect a fence between the park and the river, the court stated that "once an entity
undertakes to provide that protection, it is obligated to use reasonable care in providing
it." ML at 573. See also DCR. Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983) ("the
defendant's tort liability is not based upon breach of contract, but rather upon violation of
the legal duty independently imposed as a result of what the defendant undertook to do
with relation to the plaintiffs interests55); 57A Am Jur. 2d Negligence §208 (1989) ("Where
one undertakes an act which he has no duty to perform and another reasonably relies
upon that undertaking, the act must generally be performed with ordinary or reasonable
care55).
In this matter, the State Engineer had no duty or authority to conduct the survey of
water rights or create a groundwater management plan in the Pahvant Valley. Having
decided to do so, however, he was required to use ordinary or reasonable care in his
actions. The trial court was obligated to accept the allegations of the complaint that the
State Engineer failed to exercise reasonable care in making this survey and creating the
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groundwater management plan. The court should therefore not have granted the State's
motion to dismiss.
IV.

THE DEFENDANTS WERE ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT
THE TUTTLES AND THE ELLSWORTHS HAD WATER
RIGHTS SUFFICIENT TO IRRIGATE THE FARMS.

The defendants made at least two representations to the Tuttles that their water
rights were sufficient to irrigate their farms. The Tuttles relied on those representations
and the defendants were estopped from denying those water rights after the sale to the
Ellsworths. In order to establish equitable estoppel, a plaintiff must establish three
elements:
(1) a party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act that is inconsistent
with a later-asserted claim; (2) reasonable action or inaction by a second
party, taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or
failure to act; (3) injury to the second party resulting from allowing the first
party to repudiate its statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
Mendez v. Department of Social Services. 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1991).
In order to establish equitable estoppel against a governmental agency, the plaintiff
must establish two additional elements:
(1) [the estoppel is] necessary to prevent manifest injustice; and (2) the
exercise of governmental powers will not be impaired as a result of the
application of estoppel.

Id
The Tuttles1 equitable estoppel claim meets all of the requirements established by
the courts. The defendants represented to the Tuttles that they had sufficient water rights
to irrigate their farms. The defendants made this representation in at least two ways.
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First, when the Tuttles visited the State Engineer's Richfield regional office the defendants'
employees informed the Tuttles that if they had not received a letter, their water rights
were sufficient. Second, the defendants sent the Tuttles a letter which informed the
Tuttles that the first phase of the review of the Pahvant Valley had been completed and
everyone who had been found to be using water in violation had been notified. The
Tuttles had not received a notice that they were in violation.
The Tuttles relied on the defendants' representations when they sold their property
to the Ellsworths. Based on what they had been told by the defendants, the Tuttles
informed the Ellsworths that there were sufficient water rights to irrigate both of the
farms.
In 2000, however, the defendants unilaterally and without notice changed their
position on the water rights. At that time, they informed the Ellsworths that the water
rights were insufficient to irrigate the entire farms. As a result of this change in position,
the Ellsworths sued the Tuttles and obtained a judgment against the Tuttles of over
SI, 400,000.
In addition, application of estoppel is necessary in this matter to prevent a manifest
injustice. The Tuttles sold the farms in good faith in the belief that they had sufficient
water rights to irrigate all of the farms. Two years later, after the Tuttles had sold the
property, the defendants changed their minds about the water rights and helped the
Ellsworths obtain a judgment of over $1,400,000 against the Tuttles. It would be
manifestly unjust to allow the defendants to treat the Tuttles in this manner.
18

Finally, the exercise of governmental powers would not be impaired by the
application of estoppel in this matter. The Tuttles are not asking for an order prohibiting
the defendants from making determinations of water rights in proper circumstances.
They are asking, however, that when the defendants act without statutory authorization to
make a determination of water rights, come to a conclusion regarding a party's water
rights and then change that determination without giving the affected party notice or an
opportunity to be heard, the defendants should bear the costs of their actions instead of
passing those costs on to the holders of the water rights.
Because all of these matters must be deemed to be admitted in a motion to dismiss
or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court erred in dismissing the Tuttles5
estoppel claims.
V.

THE TUTTLES COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE OF CLAIM
PROVISIONS OF THE ACT.

The trial court's next basis for granting the defendants' motion to dismiss was the
court's finding that Tuttles failed to file a notice of claim within one year of the time their
claims arose.
At the time this matter arose, the Act provided that a notice of claim must be filed
within one year of the time a cause of action arises. See Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12. The
Act also provided that "A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if
the claim were against a private person begins to run." Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11(1).
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The question is therefore when would the statute of limitations have begun to run against
a private person for these same claims?
"limitation periods begin to run when a cause of action has accrued, which occurs
upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Bank
One Utah v. West Jordan City. 2002 U T App. 271, ^[8, 54 P.3d 135 (internal quotations
omitted). In this case, the happening of the last event necessary to complete the Tuttles1
cause of action against the defendants was the entry of the jury verdict against the Tuttles
in the Federal lawsuit. Up to that time, although the Tuttles believed that the defendants
had acted improperly, they had suffered no damages as a result of the defendants'
misconduct and could not maintain a cause of action against the defendants. It is
black-letter law that no cause of action exists until some damages have resulted from the
defendants* actions. See Valley Colour. Inc. v. Beuchert Builders. Inc.. 944 P.2d 361, 364
(Utah 1997) ("Because Valley Colour did not sustain, and therefore could not have
demonstrated, special damages until after the sale by Central Bank, it could not have
maintained its suit to conclusion until that time"); 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions
§151 ("A cause of action does not accrue for the purpose of a statute of limitations until all
the elements are present, including damages.")
The defendants claimed, and the trial court apparently believed, that the Tuttles
should have filed their notice of claim in 1998 or 1999 based on representations they
made in the Federal Court case. They claim that the statute of limitations began to run
from this time. In making this argument, however, the defendants confused the
20

Ellsworths' claims against the Tuttles with the Tuttles 1 separate a n d distinct claims against
the defendants. T h a t the statute of limitations began to run on the Ellsworths 5 claims
against the Tuttles does not m e a n that the statute of limitations began to run on the
Tuttles' claims against the defendants. Until there was a verdict in the federal lawsuit, the
Tuttles had suffered no damages from the defendants' actions a n d the Tuttles had no
cause of action against the defendants.
T h e defendants also claimed that the statute of limitations would have begun to
run from Monroe's August 2 1 , 1998 letter expressing his concerns about the Diesel Well.
This letter did not and could not have alerted the Tuttles to any problem with the well. It
stated only that the State could not see the well in its database a n d asked for help in
identifying the associated water right. It did not state or even imply that the Diesel Well
was not a valid water right or that the water rights was insufficient to irrigate the property
the Tuttles were irrigating. This letter cannot constitute the h a p p e n i n g of the last event
necessary to complete any potential cause of action because, at that time, the Tuttles had
not suffered any damages. Only when the jury verdict was entered against the Tuttles did
the Tuttles suffer damages as a result of the defendants' misconduct.
T h e Tuttles suffered no h a r m in this matter until the Federal Court jury rendered
its verdict on April 30, 2003 at the earliest. T h e Tuttles sent their notice of claim on
April, 29, 2004, which was within the one-year time period established in the Act. T h e
notice was timely and the trial court should not have granted the motion to dismiss on this
basis.
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VI.

EVEN IF T H E NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS UNTIMELY
FILED, T H E TUTTLES' ESTOPPEL AND TAKINGS
CLAIMS SHOULD N O T HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

Finally, the trial court erred in dismissing all of the Tuttles' claims on the bases
described in the court's order. That order states that the State Engineer did not have a
duty to perform an error-free survey of the water rights. Even if that were true, this would
only dispose of the Tuttles' negligence claims.
The trial court's other basis for dismissing the action was that the failed to file a
notice of claim within the time required by the Act. This would only affect claims which
are subject to the Act. The Tuttles asserted an equitable estoppel claim, which his not
subject to the Act. See Bowles v. State ex. rel. Dept. of Transportation, 652 P.2d 1345,
1346 (Utah 1982) ("governmental immunity is not a defense to equitable claims"); El
Rancho Enters.. Inc.. v. Murray City Corp.. 565 P.2d 778, 779 (Utah 1977) ("The
common law exception to governmental immunity pertaining to equitable claims has long
been recognized in this jurisdiction.")
The Tuttles also raised a takings claim under Article 1, section 22 of the Utah
Constitution, which is also not subject to the Act. See Colman v. State Land Board. 795
P.2d 622, 634 (Utah 1990) ("In sum, article I, section 22 needs no legislation to activate it;
it is mandatory and obligatory as it is").
It was therefore error for the trial court to dismiss all of the Tuttles 5 claims on the
bases described in the court's order.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in converting the defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, addressing matters outside the pleadings and failing to
accept the allegations of the complaint as true. State Engineer had no duty or authority to
conduct a survey of the groundwater rights in the Pahvant Valley and impose and
groundwater management plan unless property owners filed a petition. Because the State
Engineer acted where he had no duty, he had an obligation to conduct the survey with
reasonable care. The trial court erred in holding that the State Engineer did not have a
duty to the Tuttles in conducting the survey and creating the groundwater management
plan. In addition, all of the elements of estoppel are present in this case, and the trial
court erred in dismissing the estoppel claim. The trial court also erred in holding that the
notice of claim was untimely. The notice of claim was filed within one year of the time
the jury in the federal court imposed damages, which was the final step necessary for a
claim against these defendants. Finally, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the
Tuttles5 estoppel and takings claims on the bases described in the trial court's order. For
all of these reasons, this court should reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for
further proceedings.
DATED this <^ day of July, 2006.

Keith M. Backman
Attorney for Appellant
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AMANDA RICHARDS UP, C3H

WITNESS
March 28, 159<

Dear Water User.
The purpose of this letter is to keep you apprised of the progress
ve are making on the implementation of the ground-water management
plan for Pahvant Valley.
At the last public aieeting I held with you on February 2*. 1554, an
eight point "Proposed Ground-water Management Plan for Pahvant
Valley" (Plan) was distributed *nd a comment period was set. At
that meeting, I stated that the Plan would be phased in over a
period of three to four years and that the ongoing acreage survey
would be completed.
Based on the comments received, the firxC part of the Plan was
implemented with the promulgation of a new ^Appropriation Policy
for Pahvant Valley" on March 2, 1554
The new policy went into
effect on April 1, 1554.
Cooanonts were also received dealing with the proposal to realign
some of the ground-water districts. The comments on this proposal
were overwhelmingly negative. Aa a result, the boundaries of the
ground-weter districts were not changed. Implicit in this decision
is that no water right shall be moved cut of the district in which
it is presently located
During the spring of 1554, the acreage
water users who were irrigating land
notified
As a result of this effort
water users, all irrigated land* are
rights

^

——

^"~

—

survey was completed and all
without a water right were
and with the cooperation of
now covered by valid water
'

•

Beginning in the summer ol 1594 and continuing into the summer of
1555, a cataloging of veils was conducted by the Distribution
section of the Division. As part of the cataloging, a survey was
also made to determine the number of uncontrolled flowing wells
that were wasting water. The result of this effort was an updated
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'accounting of all significant irrigation wells and flowing wells in
the valley. In reviewing the uncontrolled flowing wells, it was
determined that the amount of water discharged by these wells was
not significant.
The Distribution section also held meetings with water users to
assess the need to establish a commissioner-operated, water userfunded distribution system and begin the n->t°.ring of wells. The
result of these meetings was that the implementation of a
distribution system and the metering of wells would be delayed to
see if the changes resulting from the acreage compilation would
resolve the problem of declining ground-water levels.
I still remain committed to the goal of reducing ground-water
withdrawals to an annual average of about 60,000 acre-feet per
year, which is considered to be the safe yield of the valley's
aquifer system.
If this can not be achieved through acreage
compliance, then additional action may be necessary. Over the past
three years, ground-water levels (as represented by the U.S.
Geological Survey continuous monitoring well near Flowell) show
continued declines.
We will continue to monitor ground-water
levels and withdrawals, but I cannot rule out the future
distribution of water based on priority rJ.ite, the establishment of
a distribution system with a commissioner, or the metering of
wells.
If forced to distribute water; by priority date, I would
establish the distribution system and order the metering of wells
first, then phase in the pumpage reductions over several years to
allow water users a reasonable amount of time to make operational
and financial adjustments.
Again, I would like-to thank you for your past cooperation in the
development and implementation of this Plan, and I look forward'to
working with you in the future.
Sincerely,

Robert L. Morgarvr P.E.
S t a t e Engineer
RLMrwes
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1

GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT PLAN

2

2006 GENERAL SESSION

3

STATE OF UTAH

5

LONG TITLE

6

General Description:

7

This bill authorizes the state engineer to create a groundwater management plan.

8

Highlighted Provisions:

9

This bill:

10

•

11
12

authorizes the state engineer to create a groundwater management plan for any
groundwater basin or aquifer,

• allows conjunctive management of hydrologically connected ground and surface

13

water;

14

• describes the purpose and effect of a groundwater management plan;

15

• outlines the requirements for creating a groundwater management plan;

16

• eliminates a provision addressing administration of groundwater rights; and

17

• makes technical changes.

IS
19
20
21

Monies Appropriated in this Bill:
None
Other Special Clauses:
None

22

Utah Code Sections Affected:

23

AMENDS:

24
25
26
27

73-5-1, as last amended by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah 2000
ENACTS:
73-5-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953
==========^^

28

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

29

Section 1. Section 73-5-1 is amended to read:

30

73-5-1. Appointment of water commissioners ~ Procedure — Hearing to

31
32

determine adequacy of underground water supply,
(1) (a) I£ in the judgment of the state engineer or the district court, it is necessary to

2GG6FL-0227/G10

10-24-05 DRAFT

33

appoint a water commissioner for the distribution of water from any river system or water

34

source, the commissioner shall be appointed for a four-year term by the state engineer.

35

(b) The state engineer shall determine whether ail or a part of a river system or other

36

water source shall be served by a commissioner, and if only a part is to be served, the state

37

engineer shall determine the boundaries of that part.

38

(c) The state engineer may appoint:

39

(i) more than one commissioner to distribute waterfromall or a part of a water source;

40

or

41
42

(ii) a single commissioner to distribute waterfromseveral separate and distinct water
sources.

43

(2) (a) The state engineer shall consult with the water users before appointing a

44

commissioner. The form of consultation and notice to be given shall be determined by the state

45

engineer so as to best suit local conditions, while providing for full expression of majority

46

opinion.

47

(b) If a majority of the water users agree upon a qualified person to be appointed as

48

water commissioner, the duties the person shall perform, and the compensation the person shall

49

receive, and they make recommendations to the state engineer on the appointment, duties, and

50

compensation, the state engineer shall act in accordance with their recommendations.

51
52

(c) If a majority of water users do not agree on the appointment, duties, or
compensation, the state engineer shall make a determination for them.

53

(3) (a) £1} The salary and expenses of the commissioner and all other expenses of

54

distribution, including printing, postage, equipment, water users' expenses, and any other

55

expenses considered necessary by the state engineer, shall be borne pro rata by the users of

56

water from the river system or water source in accordance with a schedule to be fixed by the

57

state engineer,

58

£ii} The schedule shall be based on the established rights of each water user, and the

59

pro rata share shall be paid by each water user to the state engineer on or before May 1 of each

60

year.

61
62
63

(b) The payments shall be deposited in the Water Commissioner Fund created in
Section 73-5-1.5.
(c) If a water user fails to pay the assessment as provided by Subsection (3)(a), the state
-2-
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64

engineer may do any or all of the following:

65

(I) create a lien upon the water right affected by filing a notice of lien in the office of

66

the county recorder in the county where the water is diverted and bring an action to enforce the

67

lien;

68
69

(ii) forbid the use of water by the delinquent water user or the delinquent water user's
successors or assignees, while the default continues; or

70

(iii) bring an action in the district court for the unpaid expense and salary,

71

(d) In any action brought to collect any unpaid assessment or to enforce any lien under

72

this section, the delinquent water user shall be liable for the amount of the assessment, interest,

73

any penalty, and for all costs of collection, including all court costs and a reasonable attorney

74

fee.

75

(4) (a) A commissioner may be removed by the state engineer for cause.

76

(b) The users of water from any river system or water source may petition the district

77

court for the removal of a commissioner and after notice and hearing, the court may order the

78

removal of the commissioner and direct the state engineer to appoint a successor.

79

[(5) (a) In addition to the power granted to the state ciigiueei to appoint water

80

commissioners for the distribution of water, the state engineer may, at any time, hold a hearing,

81

oi upon a petition signed by not less than one-third of the users of underground waters in any

82

area as defined by the state engineer, shall hold a hearing, to determine whether the

83

uiidcrgioiLLid water supply within such aiea Is adequate for the existing claims.]

84
85
86
87

[(b) (i) Notice of the hearing shall be given in a form and maimer which, in the
judgment of the state engineer, best suits local conditions.]
[(H) The state engineer may make a full Investigation and provide findings for the
hearing.]

88

[(e) If the findings show that the water supply Is inadequate for existing claims, the

89

state engineer shall divide, or request that the water commissioner divide, the water supply

90

among the claimants entitled to the water in aceerdance with their respective rights:]

91

Section 2. Section 73-5-15 is enacted to read:

92

73-5-15. Groundwater management plan.

93

(1) As used m this section:

94

(a) "Critical management area" means a groundwater basin in which the groundwater
-3-
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withdrawals consistently exceed the safe yield.

96

Ooi) "Safe yield* means the amount of groundwater that can be withdrawn from a

97

groundwater basin over a period of time without exceeding the long term recharge of the basin

98

or unreasonably affecting the basin's physical and chemical integrity.

99

f2) (a) The state engineer may regulate groundwater withdrawals withm a specific

100

groundwater basin by adopting a groundwater management plan in accordance with this section

101

for any groundwater basin or aquifer or combination of hydrologically connected groundwater

102

basins or aquifers.

103

(h) The objectives of a groundwater management plan are to:

104

(i) limit groundwater withdrawals to safe yield;

105

(ii) protect the physical integrity of the aquifer, and

106

(iii) protect water quality.

107

(3) fa) In developing a groundwater management plan, the state engineer may consider

108

ffl

the hydrology of the groundwater basin;

109

(ii) the physical characteristics of the groundwater basin:

110

(Hi) the relationship between surface water and groundwater, including whether the

111

groundwater should be managed in conjunction with physically connected surface waters:

112

(iv) the geographic spacing and location of groundwater withdrawals:

113

fv) water quality;

114

(vi> local well interference: and

115

(vip other relevant factors.

116

(b) The state engineer shall base the provisions of a groundwater management plan on

117
118
119
120

the principles of prior appropriation.
fc> ffl The state engineer shall use the best available scientific method to determine
safe yield.
fii> As hvdrologic conditions change or additional information becomes available, safe

121

yield determinations made bv the state engineer may be revised bv following the procedures

122

listed in Subsection (5\

123

fd) The state engineer shall adopt a groundwater management plan for a groundwater

124

basin if more than one-third of the water right owners in the groundwater basin request that the

125

state engineer adopt a groundwater management plan.
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(4) (z) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(c\ the withdrawal of water from a
groundwater basin shall be limited to the basin's safe yield

128
129

2OO6FL-O227/01Q

fifl Before limiting withdrawals in a groundwater basin to safe yield, the state engineer
shall:

130

(A) determine the groundwater basin's safe vield: and

131

(B) adopt a groundwater management plan for the groundwater basin.

132

(iii\ If the state engineer determines that groundwater withdrawals in a groundwater

133

basin exceed the safe yield, the state engineer shall regulate groundwater rights in that

134

groundwater basin based on the priority date of the water rights under the groundwater

135

management plan, unless a voluntary arrangement exists under Subsection (4)fc) that requires a

136

different distribution.

137

fb) When adopting a groundwater management plan for a critical management area, the

138

state engineer mav, based on economic and other impacts on the local community caused bv

139

the implementation of safe yield limits on withdrawals, allow gradual implementation of the

140

groundwater management plan.

141

(c) 0) Water users in a groundwater basin mav agree to participate in a voluntary

142

arrangement for managing withdrawals at any time, either before or after a determination that

143

groundwater withdrawals exceed the groundwater basin's safe vield

144
145

fip

water users under the state engineers supervision.

146
147
148

An arrangement under Subsection f4)fc)(i) mav be created bv the participating

Cm) A voluntary arrangement under Subsection (4>(cVi1 shall be consistent with other
law.
fiv) The adoption of a voluntary arrangement under this Subsection f4)(c) by less than

149

all of the water users in a groundwater basin does not affect the rights of water users who do

150

not agree to the voluntary arrangement.

151

(5) To adopt a groundwater management plan, the state engineer shall:

152

fa) hold one or more public meetings in the geographic area where the groundwater is

153
154
155
156

located, after providing 30 days' notice of the meeting, to:
(i) address the need for a groundwater management plan, including the reasons whv the
groundwater management plan should be adopted:
(jp provide and gather information and present any data, studies, or reports concerning
•5-
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the groundwater resources involved in the groundwater management plan:
fiii) address safe vield and any other subject that may be included in a potential
groundwater management plan: and

160

(iv} outline the estimated administrative costs to groundwater users:

161

(b) provide notice of the proposed plan and request comments in accordance with

162
163

Subsection (6):
(c) receive and consider written comments concerning the proposed groundwater

164

management plan from any person for a period determined bvthe state engineer of not less

165

than 60 days after the dav on which the notice required bv Subsection fflfal is given: and

166

(d) provide notice of the adoption of the groundwater management plan.

167

(6) A notice required bv this section shall be provided bv:

168

(a) publishing the notice once a week for a period of two successive weeks in a

169

newspaper of general circulation in the county where the groundwater aquifer is located: and

170

(b) publishing the notice conspicuously on the state engineer's Internet website,

171

(7) A groundwater management plan may be amended in the same manner as a

172
173

groundwater management plan may be adopted under this section.
(8) The existence of a groundwater management plan does not preclude any otherwise

174

eligible person from filing any application or challenging any decision made bv the state

175

engineer within the affected groundwater basin.

176
177

(9) fa) A person affected bv a groundwater management plan may challenge any aspect
of the groundwater management plan bv filing a complaint in the district coun for anv county

178

in which the groundwater basin is found

179

(h) Notwithstanding Subsection (8). a person may only challenge a state engineer's

180

conclusions concerning the safe vield of a groundwater basin in the manner provided bv

181

Subsection (9)(z\

182

(10) A groundwater management plan adopted or amended in accordance with this

183

section is exempt from the requirements in Title 63, Chapter 46a Utah Administrative

184

Rulemaking Act

185
186
187

fll) Recharge and recovery projects permitted under Chapter 3b are exempted from
this section*
(12) fa) A groundwater management plan adopted by the state engineer before May 1.
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188

2006 remains in force and has the same legal effect as it had on the day on which it was

189

adopted by the state engineer*

190
191

(h) An amendment to a groundwater manaecmcnt plan that existed before May 1.
2006, that is adopted on or after May 1,2006, is subiect to this section's provisions.

